

Dealing with brains, persons, societies?

On psychiatry's identity in the 21st century

Paul Hoff



Annual MeetingNyborg, 17 - 19 March, 2016





Agenda

- Psychiatry: Some specific features
- What is the *object* of psychiatry?
 Historical cornerstones
- Lessons learned?
 On psychiatry's identity in the 21st century
- Résumé






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Angst [Fear]

Edvard **Munch** 1863 - 1944







Two faces of psychiatry



«Science»



Subject

«Ars medica»

- Idiographic
- Reproducability not that important
- Focus on qualitative phenomena
- Closely linked to all scientific fields

- Object
- Nomothetic
- Reproducability as a crucial criterion
- Focus on quantitative phenomena
- Closely linked to natural sciences, especially biology





Special features of psychiatry

- Complex interdependence of scientific, social and political factors
- Controversies about its identity (e.g. medical model, antipsychiatry)
- Philosophical issues are ubiquitous, although often unpopular (e.g. mind & brain, subject & object, autonomy & determinism, person & society)





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Berlinische Monatsschrift.

I 7 8 4.

3wolftes Stut. December.

Beantwortung der Frage: Was ift Auftlarung?

(G. Decemb. 1783. G. 516.)

Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Mensschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmuns digkeit. Unmundigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Berstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen. Selbstverschuldet ist diese Unmuns digkeit, wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mansgel des Berstandes, sondern der Entschließung und des Muthes liegt, sich seiner ohne Leitung eines andern zu bedienen. Sapere aude! Habe Muth dich deines eigenen Berstandes zu bedienen! ist als so der Wahlspruch der Ausklärung.

Faulheit und Feigheit find die Ursachen, warum ein so großer Theil ber Menschen, nachdem sie die Natur längst von fremder Leitung frei gesprochen B. Monatoschr. IV. B. 6. St. Sh (na.

erlin ZLB, in: o XIV 16975-4.1784

The beginning

Kant, Immanuel (1784)

Beantwortung der Frage:
Was ist Aufklärung?

Berlinische Monatsschrift,
Heft 12, S. 481 - 494






of Psychiatry Zurich

Defining mental illness – A broad spectrum ...
























«Mentally ill»Hypotheses und metaphors
from 1750 until today

Illness of the «Ratio» **Consequence of immoral life** Illness of the brain Natural disease units Adjustment disorders Powerful unconscious factors Degeneration Resulting from poor living conditions Different existential mode Repressive concept Communicative disorder **Bio-psycho-social model**





Late 19th century "Gehirnpsychiatrie"



Theodor Meynert 1833 - 1892

Brain function as the only reality

Mental events as mere epiphenomena





Around 1900 Influential clinicians (I)



Psychiatry as an empirical medical science

"Natural disease entities"


Emil Kraepelin 1856 - 1926








Kraepelin's disease concept







Around 1900 **Influential clinicians (II)**



Biological *and* biographical factors are relevant

"Brain research and psychoanalysis"


Eugen Bleuler 1857 - 1939






20th century

Psychoanalysis and behaviorism



Unconscious elements shape personality

> Learning/Conditioning shape personality



Burrhus Frederic Skinner 1904 - 1990







«Multidimensional psychiatry»



Ernst Kretschmer 1888 - 1964

Psychiatry as a genuinely multidimensional science

Mental events as causal factors in delusional and psychotic disorders






After World War II **Anthropological psychiatry**



Ludwig Binswanger 1881 - 1966



Medard Boss 1903 - 1990



Mental disorders are biographically meaningful

(without denying biological factors!)



From 1960


Antipsychiatry

















From 1960 until today

Social psychiatry

- in a broad sense -

- New ways of psychiatric care
 - «Enquete» 1975 (Germany), community psychiatry
- Changing role models
 - shared decision making, recovery, peer involvement
- Ethical and juridical developments
 - patient autonomy, advance directives





From 1960 until today

Neuroscientific psychiatry

- Neurochemistry (e.g. dopamin hypothesis)
- Neurophysiology (e.g. EEG)
- Genetics/Epigenetics (e.g. association studies)
- Endophenotypes (e.g. P300, LDAEP)
- Brain imaging (e.g. CT, fMRT, PET)





From 1980 until today

Operationalized psychiatric diagnoses as in ICD-10 & DSM-5


- Nominalistic and categorial approach
- Etiologically neutral (not: "atheoretical"!)
- Central method: Description
- Explicit criteria / algorithms for each diagnosis
- Quantitative rather than qualitative criteria
- Comorbidity






Controversial issues
















A critical analysis

2013





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




Bio-psycho-social model: Well balanced, but less robust as it looks ...

Biological,
Psychological,
Social factors

→ Mental Disorder







What is a mental illness?

- A neuroscientific object?
 - Naturalistic-realistic definition -
- An individual reaction to stressful life events or episodes?
 - Biographical definition -
- A concept, based on expert consensus?
 - Nominalistic definition (as in ICD-10/DSM-5)





Overstretching methods: The risks

Uncritical use Approach to mental illness ... will result in ... Brain disease **naturalistic** fallacy Understandable **hermeneutic** fallacy condition formalistic fallacy ICD-10/DSM-5





of Psychiatry Zurich



Dialog Clin Neurosci 2015, 17: 6-7

Guest editorial

Why do we need a diagnosis? Maybe a syndrome is enough?

Norman Sartorius, MD, PhD, FRCPsych

Abstract

The recent publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5.1 by the American Psychiatric Association, and the continuing work of the World Health Organization on the 11th revision of

into categories? Why do we not report on our work in terms of symptoms which are sometimes the main target for investigation and treatment? Why do we not use categories describing the level of impairment or the degree of disability when talking about patients? and so on.

The abundance of questions of this type is the sad consequence of the fact that science and experience have so far failed to define a single disease in the field of psychiatry. The term "disease" can be used for conditions for which we have: (i) discovered the causes; (ii) understood the pathogenesis, (iii) comprehensively described the clinical picture and the reaction to treat-



MEDICINE

Brain disorders? Precisely

Precision medicine comes to psychiatry

By Thomas R. Insel and Bruce N. Cuthbert

ental disorders represent a public health challenge of staggering proportions. In the most recent Global Burden of Disease study, mental and substance abuse disorders constitute the leading source of years lost to disability from all medical causes (1). The World Health Organization estimates over 800,000 suicides each year globally, nearly all of which are a consequence of a mental disorder (2). These high morbidity and mortality figures speak to the potential for overall health gains if mental disorders can be more effectively diagnosed and treated. Could a "precision medicine" approach find traction here?

Precision medicine—a more targeted approach to disease-is already becoming a reality in cancer, where molecular diagnosis is leading to better defined, individualized treatments with improved outcomes (3). Precision medicine is also the basis for planning large-cohort studies, using genomics and phenotyping (physiological and behavioral characteristics) to improve diagnostics and therapeutics across medicine. The idea is to integrate clinical data with other patient information to uncover disease subtypes and improve the accuracy with which patients are categorized and treated.

health disorders" or "mental disorders" or the awkwardly euphemistic "mental health conditions," when juxtaposed against brain science, invite continual recapitulation of the fruitless "mind-body" and "nature-nurture" debates that have impeded a deep understanding of psychopathology. The brain continually rewires itself and changes gene expression as a function of learning and life events. And the brain is organized around tightly regulated circuits that subserve perception, motivation, cognition, emotion, and social behavior. Thus, it is imperative to include measures of both brain and behavior to understand the various aspects of dysfunction associated with disorders. Shifting from the language of "mental disorders" to "brain disorders" or "neural circuit disorders" may seem premature, but recognizing the need to incorporate more than subjec-

"...syndromes once considered exclusively as 'mental' are being reconsidered ... as syndromes of disrupted neural, cognitive, and behavioral systems."



University Hospital

of Psychiatry Zurich



Brain disorders? Precisely Thomas R. Insel and Bruce N. Cuthbert

Science 348, 499 (2015);


DOI: 10.1126/science.aab2358





RDoC's scope: Paving the road to «precision medicine»

University Hospital of Psychiatry Zurich





Schizophrenia in the 21st century: New insights and translation into improved therapies

Judith Pratt

This special issue focuses on recent advances in understanding the causes and the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, the approaches that are being adopted to translate this knowledge into new treatments and the analyses of recent trials with novel non-dopamine based treatments.

Over 100 years have elapsed since schizophrenia was first



Journal of Psychopharmacology 2015, Vol. 29(2) 83–84 © The Author(s) 2015 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0269881114566743 jop.sagepub.com



Howes and colleagues provide a timely update of the dopamine and glutamate hypotheses of schizophrenia pathophysiology emphasising that there is evidence for dopamine presynaptic dysfunction and glutamatergic abnormalities. They also argue for an integrated model of these key neurotransmitter systems. While it is currently challenging to mesh the genetic findings in schizo-

Programmatic focus:

«A key aim of schizophrenia research is to define the disorder in biological terms **rather than clinical presentation**.»





Editorial

Schizophrenia in the 21st century: New insights and translation into improved therapies

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Psychopharm

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«A key aim of schizophrenia research is to define the disorder in biological terms rather than clinical presentation.»

But:

If we deny the scientific relevance of all non-biological (e.g. descriptive, phenomenological and hermeneutical) approaches, we will again be advocating a narrow naturalistic reductionism.







To sum up the present state of psychiatric affairs ...

- Not a single one of the available theories will be able to fully meet the high demands psychiatry is confronted with.
- Therefore, the multidimensional approach is not a peripheral issue in psychiatry ("nice to have"), but situated at its very centre.





Why single-method approaches cannot work in psychiatry

- Medicine needs the three elements of
 - Knowledge
 - Skills
 - Values


to be balanced towards each other.





«KSV balance» in medicine

Knowledge Skills Values








«KSV balance» in medicine

University Hospital of Psychiatry Zurich


Knowledge Skills Values







Immanuel Kant 1724 - 1804











Johann Gottlieb Fichte 1762 - 1814





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When using the term "mental illness", we implicitly refer to a specific concept, not to a given thing.

This principle is equally applicable to concepts founded in neurobiology, psychology (hermeneutics) and social sciences.





This does not at all weaken psychiatry's identity as a medical discipline.

On the contrary: It respectfully reflects psychiatry's status as a fundamentally multidimensional field.





Acknowledging subjectivity and interpersonality as indispensable elements of psychiatry (although they do *not* fit into strictly naturalistic frameworks), will not impede neurobiological research, but strengthen it.





4 So, whom or what do we treat?

- We treat persons.
- But persons
 - who do have a bodily existence
 - who can fully realize their personhood only in the interaction with others.







Angelika **Linke** Yvonne **IIg** Linguistics UZH

Jakob **Tanner** Marina **Lienhardt** Social History UZH

Margit **Tröhler** Veronika **Rall** Film Studies UZH

Paul **Hoff** Anke **Maatz** Psychiatry UZH

www.schizophrenie.uzh.ch





You are cordially invited!

OBJECTS OF PSYCHIATRY

Between thing-making, reification & personhood

International Conference: Zurich, June 8 – 11, 2016

KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

Prof. Dr. Peter **Galison**, Harvard University

Prof. Dr. Dagmar **Herzog**, City University of New York

Prof. Dr. Lutz Jäncke, University of Zurich

Prof. Dr. Norman Sartorius, University of Geneva





Burghölzli Summer 2012





Zurich Summer 2014





Thank you very much for your attention!

